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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
Vol. 54 MAY 1956 
COMPARATIVE LEGAL RESEARCH* 
SOME REMARKS ON 
"LOOKING OUT OF THE CAVE" 
Hessel E. Yntemat 
No. 7 
THE most famous of Plato's similes commences the Seventh Book of The Republic, in which the fundamental distinction 
between shadow and reality is presented. Imagine a cave in which 
men are chained so that they are unable to look behind them to 
the entrance but can see only a wall in the rear, on which appear 
the shadows of performers engaged in all sorts of activities, who 
pass between them and the light. The inhabitants of this cave-
world, Plato observes, regard the shadows as real; one who chanced 
to escape into the light of the sun, if he were to return with strange 
new notions of truth and justice and therefore proceed to question 
the shadows as a source of knowledge, the cave dwellers would 
undoubtedly punish with severity, even perhaps with death. 
This allegory in which Plato contrasts the shadow world of 
appearances with the realities of reason is an appropriate text to 
invite consideration of the relations between "comparative law," 
as it is ineptly termed in English, and legal research. Even at first 
blush, the text is fonvard-looking; it suggests that we should look 
out of the cave and give realistic consideration to the problems of 
legal research, and not merely indulge in polite exchange of mutu-
al satisfaction with things as they are. But at the same time, while 
the text suggests the possibility that enlightenment in legal re-
search may come from comparison, it also carries a premonition 
of the dire fate of those who would import alien ideas into the 
shadow land of positive law. In the Platonic conception, the 
• This article in substance reproduces an address given at the Conference on Aims 
and Methods of Legal Research, held at the University of Michigan Law Quadrangle, 
Ann Arbor, November 4, 1955. It is to be reprinted with comment in the proceedings of 
the Conference. 
It should be observed that, in view of the topic assigned, no effort is made herein 
to consider the problems of factual, as distinguished from comparative, legal research. 
t A.B. 1912, A.M. 1915, Hope College; A.M. 1913, Ph. D. 1919, University of Mich-
igan; B.A. Guris) 1917, Oxford; S.J.D. 1921, Harvard; Research Professor of Comparative 
Law, University of Michigan.-Ed. 
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images, or the shadows of the images of justice, appearing in the 
decision of particular cases, each in the particular setting of some 
.local system of courts and legislative regulation, can be but pale 
reflections qf the eternal light of justice. And the cave men shun 
the light. . 
Despite t~is risk and without limiting discussion of compara-
tive legal research to a Platonic theory of knowledge-to which I 
for one would not accede-the text prompts first the inquiry, un-
avoidable in a constructive discussion of the matter, whether 
contemporary legal study in the United States is concerned with 
shadows in an intellectual cave-or in other words, whether it is 
true, as I was told years ago, partly perhaps in jest, by a late dis-
tinguished member of the Supreme Court, then Attorney Gen-
eral, when, encountering me on a visit to the Department of J us-
tice, he kindly asked what I was looking for, and I said, "Justice," 
that it was the last place to look. 
I 
An inquiry into the adequacy of legal education in the United 
States at the present time from the viewpoint of comparative legal 
research is as difficult and delicate as it is essential. It is diffic"Qlt, 
since it requires laying aside traditional and deep-rooted precon-
ceptions concerning the function and scope of legal science, de-
rived from prepossessions of positive municipal law. It is delicate, 
since these preconceptions are supported by a powerful complex 
of vested professional interests, which those beneficially concerned 
find it difficult to discuss without prejudice. In all countries, the 
legal profession jealously guards its local privileges, while it is 
common knowledge that no passion exceeds that of a law professor 
for his favorite course. But the inquiry is nevertheless essential 
to evaluate the present prospects and needs of comparative legal 
research, since without some conception of the place of legal re-
search in the cosmos of human endeavor and some inspection of 
the conditions under which it presently has to be conducted, in-
telligent consideration of the premises would not be feasible. Con-
sequently, after stating the place of legal research in legal educa-
tion, a preliminary answer to the inquiry may be essayed by drawing 
attention to certain crucial features of existing American legal 
culture, which may serve to outline certain imperative needs for 
the development ot comparative legal research at the present time. 
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It will be obvious, in the first place, that the placement of legal 
research in legal education is dependent upon the conceived na-
ture and scope of legal science. It may be assumed that, in the 
performance of a complex social function such as the administra-
tion of a modem system of justice, there is need for systematic 
legal education in order to prepare those who are called to the bar 
for the various services rendered by members of the profession. 
The most obvious function of this branch of the law, broadly con-
ceived, thus is the instruction of those who seek to enter the pro-
fession, in the necessary qualifications for their prospective offices. 
It does not need to be emphasized that this function of legal edu-
cation-namely, the transmission of existing legal knowledge and 
development of the abilities needed by those who aspire to prac-
tice law-has become highly specialized, due to the great number 
of those required to provide professional services in our progres-
sively regimented civilization and the increasing mass and com-
plexity of the materials to be mastered. These aspects of legal 
education do not concern the present inquiry as such, but only as 
they condition comparative legal research or indeed it should 
appear that adequate professional preparation includes such re-
search. This will be touched upon later. 
But legal education is something more than indoctrination in 
what has been or acquirement of technical expertise. It also con-
templates that at least the principal centers of legal education have 
in effect a scientific mission, a responsibility for the constant re-
finement and extension of our knowledge of law, regarded as the 
practical realization of justice. This idea may be illustrated by a 
passing analogy to another branch of education, in which theory 
is also closely allied with practice, namely medicine. It needs no 
argument today-though it did in Moliere's time-that in the field 
of medicine, devoted to the cure of disease and public health, the 
great medical centers are expected to do more than to imbue the 
acolytes of Hippocrates with the accepted materia and methods of 
medicine; their intensive training is integrated with extensive 
hospital services, and in particular, with persistent, elaborate re-
search to improve medical practice. The field of engineering offers 
a significant, if later, parallel. The conception that research is an 
essential responsibility of education is not peculiar to medicine; it 
pervades the physical and social sciences generally, and its value 
has been demonstrated beyond question. The lesson for legal 
education is obvious. 
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This example at once gives a touchstone to distinguish certain 
useful but inferior or spurious types of legal research. We would 
not regard as research such activities as the dissection of a cadaver 
by a student in anatomy, nor the production of a treatise on that 
topic, summarizing die current knowledge of bodily structure, nor 
mere practice in laboratory analysis, nor the collection of a number 
of case histories for instruction in medical practice, and it would 
be advantageous to be equally scrupulous in designating analogous 
activities in connection with legal education. This would of course 
exclude from consideration as legal research much contemporary 
legal production, the purpose of which is not to extend, but to 
brief our knowledge of law, whether to support a client's claim, to 
facilitate legal instruction, or to transmit information for students 
or practitioners. Here are to be included the prolific casebooks, 
conventional textbooks, analogous law review contributions, and 
even such epitomes of current doctrine as Corpus Juris Secundum 
and the Restatement of the Law. While any of these may embody 
the results of true research, this, if not accidental, is incidental to 
the object in view and the subject matter, all contrived to tell what 
has been and not specifically to extend legal science. The great 
preponderance of this type of legal literature is doubtless an un-
fortunate necessity, owing to the voluminous complexity of the 
legal materials, and it is indispensable for legal practice. But the 
activities of which these are the end products can be termed legal 
research only by courtesy. 
If now it be asked, what then, if not these common types of 
legal study, is legal research, the answer implied in the foregoing 
is simply the scientific study of law. In sum, this conception, so 
successfully employed in other branches of knowledge, involves 
two things: the formulation of more or less general proposition~ 
about the subject matter under scrutiny and their verification by 
observation, the ultimate ends being increased accuracy and econ-
omy in the representation of experience. The principal techniques 
employed in this process of the formulation and verification of 
hypotheses to ascertain whether they are true, are: controlled ex-
perimentation, in which the possible variables are previously fixed, 
or comparison of relevant historical events, whether in time or in 
place or more typically both, serving to cancel out the variables.1 
While it should not be presumed that the technique of controlled 
1 For elaboration, see the writer's article, :'The Implications of Legal Science," 10 
N.Y. UNIV. L. Q. REv. 279 (1933). 
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experimentation with respect to regulation of human conduct by 
law necessarily requires a dictatorial regime with human guinea 
pigs at its disposal-Underhill Moore's well-known study of auto-
mobile traffic in New Haven2 demonstrated that such investiga-
tions are feasible under democratic conditions-this type of re-
search has practical limitations. Not only are such inquiries difficult 
and expensive, but there are ideological impediments; the formu-
lation of law engrosses attention, rather than its effects. Charac-
teristically, centers of legislative research are designed to aid in 
drafting new laws, not to test them; in prevalent legal theory, the 
judicial decision, not what it accomplishes in a human situation, 
is the criterion of justice. Under these conditions, it is obvious that 
scientific study of law must primarily consist of comparative ob-
servation and analysis; indeed, even if the existing experimental 
knowledge of how law operates were far less fragmentary than it 
is-and I for one do not see how the need and significance of such 
knowledge could be overstated-it would still have to be compara-
tive, if only to make sure that what happens in Ann Arbor is dupli-
cated in Ruritania. 
In this sense, comparative law is another name for legal science, 
an integral part of the more comprehensive universe of social or 
human science. More specifically, the term comparative law com-
monly denotes reference in legal study to the laws of more than 
one jurisdiction, or to foreign law. In the former sense, the influ-
ential conception of a common law, Anglo-American or Romanic, 
forming a body of general doctrine, subsidiary to the local laws in 
a federation or other suprastate community, is obviously compara-
tive within its orbit-an incomplete comparative law. The latter, 
and today more usual meaning of comparative law, embracing also 
foreign legal systems, has a universal humanistic outlook, not de-
limited by political frontiers; like other branches of science, it 
contemplates that, while techniques may vary, the problems of 
justice are basically the same in time and space throughout the 
world. As Pascal long ago observed, it were a singular justice that 
a river bounded. 
II 
We need not linger to elaborate the theoretical objections that 
the idea of legal science has encountered; these are the progeny of 
the positivistic territorial conception of law that Pascal ridiculed. 
2 Moore and Callahan, "Law and Learning Theory: A Study in Legal Control," 53 
YALE L.J. I (1943). 
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One, fully argued by Kirchmann over a century ago,3 is that law 
consists of legislation, which can at any time be wiped out by a 
stroke of a pen-a contingency that areas dominated by legislative 
law not infrequently suffer. Another, to paraphrase a famous re-
mark of Chief Justice Hughes apropos of the Constitution, is that 
law is what the courts say it is, a flexible body of precedents not 
susceptible of scientific analysis. 
This latter assumption, today too prevalent, deserves a paren-
thetical comment. While the uncertainty of jurisprudential law-
"the imaginary law extracted by each man for himself out of a mass 
of jurisprudence"4-was castigated by Bentham many years ago, 
as serving the partnership interest of bench and bar in three dis-
tinguishable ways: by increasing the number of lawsuits, by in-
creasing the quantity of legal advice that must be purchased by 
litigants, present, past, and prospective, and by increasing the 
arbitrary power of the judiciary proportionably to the degree of 
uncertainty, the judicentric conception of law has not merely sur-
vived, but has become a dominant legal philosqphy. The rela-
tivistic hyopthesis that application of legal norms by the courts in 
individual cases is the ultimate criterion of law and justice, is 
embodied in the doctrine of the leading contemporary legal theo-
retician, Hans Kelsen, and in the United States has been most 
bravely and persistently advanced by the distinguished author of 
Law and the Modern Mind,5 for whom the only certainty about 
law is that it is uncertain. It is a patent fallacy to say that, because 
law is not always certain, it must be always uncertain; if this were 
so, there would be no warrant for lawyers' fees. This supposes that, 
law· being essentially decisional, uncertainties in the minority of 
disputed cases reviewed are fairly representative of the vast major-
ity of litigious situations in which the rule and its application are 
not in dispute, not to speak of all the customary activities of the 
community that transpire without benefit of counsel. This theory, 
carrying an unreal notion of science as absolutely exact, and hence 
as excluding statement in terms of contingency or probability, 
apparently precludes a priori the existence of sequences in legal 
events that can be compared and doubtless would accordingly deny 
the possibility of comparative legal research. 
3 KIRCHMANN, DIE WERTLOSIGKEIT DER JURISPRUDENZ ALS WISSENSCHAFT (1848), 
4 "Rationale of Judicial Evidence," Bk. viii, c. xxiv, 7 WORKS OF JEREMY BENmAM 310 
(Bowring, 1843). 
5 FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930). 
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A third objection, opposed specifically to comparative legal 
study, merits even less consideration, namely, the notion that a 
native of a common-law country such as the United States cannot 
possibly comprehend the basic ideas of the civil law, and vice versa. 
It would be strange indeed if the descendants of Scotch, French, 
Spanish, German, Italian, Belgian, Swiss, Dutch, or other civil-law 
progenitors, were unable to understand the laws of the respective 
countries of their ancestors, simply because they happened to be 
born and educated in the United States. This of course is not true; 
if it were, it would be the worst possible indictment of the system 
of law or legal instruction supposed to be generally unintelligible. 
The idea that legal concepts are strictly national and cannot be 
assimilated by foreigners is cherished, not by those who have 
studied law comparatively, but only by those who know not 
whereof they speak. 
These arguments that legislation is ephemeral, that case law is 
incalculable, or that legal ideas are not internationally communi-
cable, are obviously frivolous objections to legal science. Inspired 
by the absolutist dogma of territorial sovereignty as the source of 
law, they presuppose that law is authoritative directive, geographi-
cally localized, and not justice. In consequence, they reflect inade-
quate theories of the place of law in society and foster inflated 
estimates of official discretionary power. We therefore pass them 
by, to consider the far more serious difficulty with the scientific 
conception of legal research, presented by the enormous mass of 
technical legal materials and the consequent professional and prac-
tical introversion of legal education. The difficulty is not that 
scientific legal study is inherently incompatible with professional 
training, but that these two functions of legal education have not 
been successfully integrated in the United States, with the result 
that legal research has in a degree been starved to meet the pressing 
demands of practical instruction. 
III 
This brings in view the central problem in this discussion: the 
conditions confronting comparative legal research in modern 
America. The first impression of this scene, regarded as a stage 
for the serious development of comparative legal research, is that 
there is some evidence of a more or less general watering down of 
intellectual standards, both in general culture and, more particu-
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Iarly, in legal education-if not in all phases of knowledge, at least 
in certain branches of vital importance for such research.6 
Take for example the matter of linguistic preparation. In 
charity, we may leave aside the average degree of proficiency among 
high school and college graduates, in reading, writing, and speak-
ing proper English, the first technical skill requisite for the prac-
titioner, not to sp~ak of those employed in legal education. This 
is naturally of concern also in legal research; in addition, to the 
extent that legal materials in a foreign language are to be con-
sulted, corresponding linguistic preparation is necessary. No one, 
for instance, can undertake a serious study of the civil law, or of 
any branch of ancient, medieval, or early modern law without at 
least some understanding of Latin. The more recent national laws 
must be read_ for the most part in their native tongues; only to a 
limited extent are English translations of such materials available, 
and these are not reliable-as all well know, translation is a treach-
erous vehicle of communication. For these reasons, as well as f9r 
its special value as linguistic training and as a key to a number of 
modern languages, including English, it is peculiarly .unfortunate 
that, for so many of those who seek higher education, the teaching 
of Latin has been relegated to the limbo of obsolete electives. 
Even the Rhodes Scholarship appointments, shortly after my time, 
had to dispense with the original requireme~ts of Latin and Greek; 
these had become a superfluity in the intellectual careers of many 
American students, who were thus denied a glimpse in the ver-
nacular at the glory that was Greece · and the grandeur that was 
Rome. 
The situation with respect to modern languages is only less 
dismal; undoubtedly, it has been improved by the voluntary or 
compulsory visits of many young Americans to foreign countries 
in recent years. At the higher level of studies in natural science, 
these deficiencies are partly counteracted by the requirement, sat-
isfied often too little and too late in life, of a reading knowledge 
of perhaps two foreign languages. But for the study of law, a cen-
6 Mr. John R. Starrs of the Detroit bar has kindly drawn my attention to Roscoe 
Pound's article on "A Generation of Law Teaching," 38 MICH. L. REV. 16 at 24-25 (1939): 
"Yet looking back over forty years of teaching (for I began law teaching in 1899), I 
seem to see certain effects of college teaching of the social sciences to students with no 
training in logic or in languages requiring accurate attention to accidence, grammar and 
context. I seem to feel an increasing difficulty in teaching the technique of legal reason-
ing to students with a predominantly literary training, satisfied with plausible specula-
tion and clever writing, with no sound basis in exact information, no clear philosophical 
background and no habits of consecutive thought. Certainly the contrast between the 
feeling of students today and those of yesterday about a course in the law of real property 
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tral part of human culture, no such modicum of linguistic prepara-
tion is expected-not even for appointment to a law faculty. This 
is a relatively recent condition; in the golden age of Kent and Story 
and even to the turn of the century, the luminaries of the profes-
sion had not lost the keys to comparative law and could cite the 
Digest or Pothier to their purpose as readily as their successors 
today quote the Restatement of the Law. But since then, the per-
centage of those who in this essential respect are qualified for com-
parative legal research has become exiguous indeed in the United 
States; many of these had the good fortune to have been trained 
abroad in their early years. In the result, if the legal profession in 
the United States is not completely monolingual, this is no fault 
of our law schools, which should have taken measures to forestall 
this trend in preliminary education years ago. 
In the second place, knowledge of history, philosophy, includ-
ing scientific method, and social science, and inculcation of ex-
tensive as well as intensive reading habits in these and related 
aspects of general culture among the population of the colleges, 
the law schools, and their graduates, is assuredly of no less impor-
tance than linguistic proficiency alone as a base for the humanistic 
study of law. From this viewpoint, not merely the necessarily 
limited training received in school is significant, but even more so 
the extent to which active interest in the progress of these _branches 
of knowledge and, in particular, the advances made in legal science, 
as well as in the technical aspects of immediate practice, develops 
in later years. Without such interest, inevitably the intellectual 
horizons of the profession will be limited by a gradually fading, 
contracting, and ossifying memory of what little was learned years 
ago in student days, now doubtless more or less obsolete. •For this 
reason, it is of extreme importance that in college and professional 
school the student should be inspired with habits of self-education 
that will persist after graduation. This for our purpose is highly 
important; obviously, it would be difficult to propagate a flourish-
ing development of comparative legal science among an association 
of, let us say, carpenters or even civil engineers, or to find qualified 
is significant. It did not seem hard to the student of my generation, although it took up 
more of the curriculum than it does now. The first year course in property in 1889-90 
covered more ground than has generally been attempted in recent years, and covered it 
thoroughly. Today, the subject seems to bewilder students. The things which are simply 
so and must be learned as such, and the exact logical development of propositions to reach 
assuredly predictable results are not congenial to the habits of thinking and study of a 
generation not raised on the Latin grammar, the Greek verb, and compulsory mathe-
matics." 
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researchers among them, unless a sufficient proportion of the mem-
bers acquired the necessary background and generated a genuine 
interest in such matters. This does not exclude the possibility of 
individual contributions which may be of the greatest significance 
-of a Montesquieu, a Marshall, or a Maitland, for example. But 
their success will depend upon an audience of qualified and intelli-
gent readers. In short, the effective development of comparative 
legal research, as of any other needed intellectual activity, is con-
ditioned by (a) the availability of an adequately qualified body of 
recruits and (b) the presence of sufficient interest among those for 
whom such research is to be undertaken, an interest which in the 
nature of things can be evoked only by general understanding of 
the character and significance of what is contemplated. 
How far the contemporary scene can be measured in these 
terms, it would be difficult to demonstrate. However, a few illus-
trative items may be adduced. One item is the avidity with which 
law students accept an invitation to read books on legal and po-
litical philosophy; one tells me; for instance, that he had never 
before opened John Austin's Lectures on Jurisprudence; another, 
a specialist in political theory, that his previous acquaintance with 
the outstanding contributions in this field had been secondhand. 
Or, to speak of experiences nearer home, in the comparative law 
field, the difficulties in starting and· prosecuting such ventures as 
the late 'Ernst Rahel's comparative survey of conflicts law, and 
Vladimir Gsovski's two volumes on Soviet Civil· Law, would be 
an illuminating tale, unfortunately too long and even too parlous 
to unfold on this occasion.· Yet even now the value of these monu-
mental contributions is not widely recognized in professional cir-
cles. A partner in one of the first New York law firms, for example, 
wrote some time since that their library would not purchase Ra-
bel' s work, as it was not a law book. 
The problems encountered in developing the subscription list 
of the American ] ournal of Comparative Law are perhaps more 
symptomatic. This enterprise, sponsored by sixteen leading law 
schools and the American Foreign Law Association, during the past 
four years has built up a list of over 1000 subscribers to the J our-
nal, with remarkably few cancellations, and we are told that this is 
most satisfactory. As a matter of fact, this compares favorably with 
the support given to the chief reviews in the field in France and 
England, which have been. established for fifty years or more. And 
it should be added that the list includes the principal law libraries 
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throughout the world. But it is disconcerting to reflect that of the 
1000 or so subscribers, about 600 are in the United States, a large 
proportion of these being libraries, leaving some 300 most appre-
ciated individual subscriptions from a population of perhaps a 
quarter million. (How many of these are law professors is classi-
fied information.) Perhaps an explanation of the foregoing expe-
rience may be suggested by a response recently received from the 
librarian of a federal circuit court, located in a great seaboard 
center of commerce and culture, to whom a complimentary set of 
the first volume of the Journal had been sent, accompanied by a 
special subscription offer, to the effect that the library would not 
subscribe since the judges were interested only in the federal laws 
and cases. 
The hypothesis that examples- such as these suggest is that law 
is scarcely a learned profession in the United States and, for most 
lawyers, is regarded as an honorable trade. Indeed, it is commonly 
observed that the more successful a lawyer is, the less law he has 
to read-this is for the bright young apprentices from the law 
reviews. Doubtless, there are notable exceptions, whose brilliance 
is enhanced by the shade in which they shine, but to the degree 
that the hypothesis is true, it should provoke, not recrimination, 
but inquiry respecting the causes of a condition that is of funda-
mental importance to the development of legal science, historical, 
comparative, or functional. The thesis that suggests itself in re-
sponse to this hypothesis is-Look to the law schools, or more spe-
cifically, to the law that is taught. This is the most responsible 
element in fixing the intellectual pattern of the profession. 
IV 
In Western Europe, the tradition of legal education goes back 
to the early Renaissance.7 Indeed, the phenomenal development 
of civil-law studies, starting at Bologna in the twelfth century, was 
one of the chief influences in the growth of the continental uni-
versities, in which law formed one of the four traditional faculties. 
In consequence, law was integrated with other branches of educa-
tion, and the universities were in position to control legal instruc-
tion. This instruction for centuries was of a universal character, 
7 This development is reviewed by the writer in the "Introduction" to ANDRFS BELLO, 
DERECHO ROMANO, which is to appear in the new official edition of BELLO, OBRAS CoM-
PLETAS, which is being published by the Venezuelan Government under the editorial 
direction of Professor Rafael Caldera. 
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based upon the premise that the Roman law as codified in the 
Corpus Juris Civilis was the common law of Western Europe-the 
general law of the Holy Roman Empire or at least universally 
applicable by virtue of its authority as reason. For a brief period, 
the period of the Glossators, therefore, legal study was concen-
trated on establishment of the texts, but it soon was devoted to the 
usus modernus, the common doctrine evolved by the Commen-
tators and their successors through construction of the texts in the 
light of current needs, which was regarded as the fundamental 
subsidiary law in countries where the civil law was received. This 
conception of a currently accepted body of doctrine as the basic· 
law, quite analogous to the notion of the Anglo-American common 
law, although challenged by the humanistic effort of Cujas and his 
successors to restore the texts by scientific historical study of Ro-
man antiquities, prevailed in legal study until the eighteenth cen-
tury, when in the Age of Enlightenment the new courses in the 
law of nature and of nations for a time eclipsed instruction in civil 
law and presaged the adoption of national codes in Prussia (1794), 
France (1804), Austria (1811), and other countries. In theory, 
the enactment of these codes and the dissolution of the Empire in 
1806, destroyed the unity of the civil law; in actuality, however, 
the codes were in effect a restatement of the current civil-law doc-
trine, and, as a result notably of the influence of the historical 
school of Savigny, the scientific study of law was revived and in-
tensified, so that, alongside of the codes, it has formed, together 
with related courses in jurisprudence and legal history, the essen-
tial basis of legal education in civil-law countries. Evolved within 
the universities, law is a humanistic as well as a practical science. 
In England, the successful resistance on nationalistic grounds 
to formal (though not to substantive) reception of the civil law 
and the early organization of the legal profession in the inns of 
court enabled the bar to monopolize legal training and admission 
to practice. In consequence, the establishment of civil law in the 
universities and the introduction by Blackstone in the middle of 
the eighteenth century of lectures on the common law for gentle-
men as well as lawyers, enabled the universities to concentrate on 
the theoretical and historical branches of law, including the Ro-
man law, which is a basic comparative element in the academic 
scheme of legal education. Thus in England as on the Continent 
of Europe,· theoretical training in law precedes apprenticeship in 
practice. The scientific and technical phases of legal education are 
effectively differentiated, the first recognized as the responsibility 
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of the universities, the second inculcated in principle in the place 
where practice can be most efficiently learned, in the chambers of 
a practitioner. 
In the United States, legal education is dominated by a new 
institutional type, the professional law school.8 Originating in the 
initial era as a proprietary substitute for apprentice preparation 
for legal practice, it is of interest to observe how these institutions 
have acquired a recognized place in the universities so as to give 
academic prestige to what is basically training in the trade. After 
colonial times, in which it was customary after college for prospec-
tive lawyers to read law under the guidance of a member of the 
bar, there was a brief period of experimentation during which 
various efforts were made to implant in the colleges courses in law 
and government, more or less fashioned after the Blackstonian or 
Continental models. This might have been a golden moment to 
advance legal education, for at the same time the democratic, or 
more accurately the republican, trend of the times was about to 
liquidate the requirements for admission to the bar, along with 
property qualifications for election and other class or professional 
privileges; as it became no longer necessary for the law student to 
read law in an attorney's office for a prescribed number of years, 
the door was opened for formal legal training. But the colleges 
were not prepared to exploit the opportunity; the various efforts 
to introduce nonvocational courses in law and related subjects at 
William and Mary, Virginia, Columbia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, 
and Harvard, either withered on the vine or evolved into profes-
sional schools. The only really successful law school of the time 
was that at Litchfield, where from about 1782 to 1833 a narrow 
course of instruction in private law, or in other words, a superior 
curriculum of apprentice training, was offered. This model, a 
more or less autonomous, proprietary school, with a strictly pro-
fessional curriculum, was the type around which "the mantle of 
Yale was wrapped" in 1824 and, more important in its eventual 
influence, after the abandonment of Chief Justice Parker's pro-
gram in 1829, was accepted as the basis of the new look given to 
legal education at Harvard by one of the greatest jurists of his time, 
Joseph Story. In view of his appreciation of the humanities and 
his unique attainments in comparative law, it is ironical that Story 
excluded all such topics, in this respect following the Litchfield 
8 See especially REED, TRAINING FOR TIIE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF nm I.Aw (1921), and 
PRESENT-DAY LAW SCHOOLS IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA (1928). 
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curriculum, in the program then effectively instituted at Harvard.9 
The explanation was obvious-Chief Justice Parker's program had 
not attracted students, and it was a question of ensuring returns 
from the box office. 
Thus the die was cast. For educational purposes, government 
was divided into two separate spheres: professional legal training 
vs. whatever else pertains to human affairs. On the one hand, the 
law schools, following the eminently successful plan of' Nathan 
Dane to establish a national common law in the United States 
through the teaching and writings of Justice Story and his succes-
sors at Harvard, concentrated on the common law decisions relat-
ing to private law, in principle excluding local state legislation, 
criminal law, and public law ( excepting the constitutional juris-
prudence), as well as the civil law. Reinforced by the concrete 
method of case study later introduced by Langdell, this vocational 
conception a fortiori disclaimed responsibility either to instruct the 
layman in what he should know about government by law in a 
democracy or to consider law in the light of reason, justice, or 
science. Such matters were left to the colleges and universities, 
upon which also devolved the development of the social sciences 
generally. It is small wonder that since Story's time, comparative 
law in the United States has been a poor Cinderella, who missed 
her date at midnight, lost between more engrossing professional 
and academic preoccupations of law school and university. 
It has also resulted that there has been no effective control over 
nonvocational prerequisites of admission to legal study. For a 
9 Regarding the curriculum of the Harvard Law School in Story's time, Reed states: 
"In the second place, in its curriculum the school projected more than it actually 
carried out. Generalities in Story's inaugural address as to Philosophy, Rhetoric, History 
and Oratory may be iguored. His failure, while professing to believe in the value of such 
studies for lawyers, to find any place for them in the curriculum of his school is of interest 
chiefly as destroying a possible defense for his failure to insist upon college study. What 
he did do in his first curriculum, published in 1830, was to supplement the common-law 
and equity subjects, already taught by Stearns, by textbooks in Civil Law, International 
Law, Criminal Law, and Constitutional Law, including in the latter American state con-
stitutions as well as the law of the federal constitution. In 1832, however, all these topics 
except the last (federal constitutional law) were dropped from the regular two-year course, 
now outlined as an alternative to the three-year course originally contemplated. Although 
until 1850 the additional subjects continued to be more or less vaguely offered as extra 
studies, for students who would consent to stay an additional year, ('For gentlemen who 
remain in the Institution three years, other studies are prescribed.' Catalogue, 1835.) the 
intensive work of the school was henceforth confined to its original narrow field, supple-
mented only by study of the federal constitution. Not merely state government but also 
statutory law was eliminated. (Hence, doubtless, the omission of Criminal Law, which in 
many states was early placed upon a statutory basis. This topic was not restored to the 
curriculum until 1848, after Story's death. See further as to the curriculum, Chapter 
XXIX, and Appendix, pages 453-456, 458.)" TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE 
I.Aw 146-147 (1921). 
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time, in fact, these were negligible, and the law schools actually 
competed with the colleges for students. Today, this has been 
partly remedied, and a modicum of cultural preparation is needed 
to enter law school or to qualify for the bar. But there is no agree-
ment on what such preparation should be and no real disposition 
to look behind the high school or college diplomas to make sure 
that applicants are in fact qualified. The law schools automatically 
accept the more or less standardized products of the system of 
public or private instruction. 
The effect upon the legal curriculum itself is patent. The box 
office makes it necessary to limit the law course to three years, 
regardless of the adequacy of the term or its repercussions upon 
the nature and content of instruction. These are aggravated by 
a cumulation of factors. In the first place, the progressive indus-
trialization and consequent regimentation of human activities in 
modern life have vastly increased the quantity and complexity of 
legal materials. In the second place, a growing population with an 
expanding volume of laws and orders needs more and more legal 
services, for which a constantly enlarged number of students must 
be trained. In the third place, such mass production of lawyers 
inevitably tends to lower the average level both of the student body 
and also of the greater number of instructors required. In the 
fourth place, as a result of the extended interests of the United 
States in world affairs and in international trade, a pressing need 
to provide training for international as well as national leadership, 
not only for domestic students but also for those from abroad who 
in increasing numbers seek instruction in our law schools, adds 
new problems in a curriculum already surcharged with the con-
ventional topics of domestic law. Finally, in the fifth place, the 
typical casuistical mode of instruction-the case method-is ill-
adapted for standardized mass education: it is expensive in time to 
cover a topic by real Socratic discussion of anecdotal detail; such 
treatment characteristically emphasizes ad hoc judicial utterances 
and almost inevitably sacrifices basic theory to the details of judi-
cial legislation; and as regulation is extended to new fields-rail-
roads, motor vehicles, aircraft, taxes, trade practices, nuclear power, 
or whatnot-new courses press for attention, so that less and less 
complete or more and more superficial must the curriculum be. 
In this dilemma, in a philistine environment, courses that, 
however mistakenly, are regarded as nonvocational, inevitably are 
sacrificed to the box office. Since Story's time, the study of civil 
law, except where it is of immediate professional interest, as in 
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Louisiana, has been restricted; few indeed are the graduates of our 
law schools who have even been invited to examine, however super-
ficially,_the main stream of legal culture in the v\Testern world from 
ancient Rome to contemporary civil-law developments and fewer 
still those w:ho have studied it sufficiently to undertake significant 
research in legal history or comparative law.10 The same fate 
attends related topics; the history of the common law itself, for 
example, which in the days of Langdell and Holmes was inten-
sively traced, also has become terra incognita for the great majority 
of law students; jurisprudence maintains a sort of marginal exist-
ence, partly fed by the perennial interest in philosophy in a trou-
bled world, partly by adulteration into formalistic case analysis or 
a speedy view of a particular system of justice, and partly indeed 
by the inextinguishable interest of intelligent members of the bar 
in those general aspects of legal thought that seem to lend dignity 
and meaning to their mundane occupations. This condition natu-
rally is reflected in the paucity of scholarly legal publications in the 
United States as compared with the variety of texts and mono-
graphs appearing in other leading jurisdictions. 
Thus the law school curriculum tends to resemble the academy 
of astronomy in Aristophanes' play, whose pupils, bottoms up, 
diligently grubbed in the ground to learn the movements of the 
stars. Undoubtedly, even from the most practical viewpoint, it is 
a mistake to sacrifice the general aspects of law to provide a little 
more bread and butter detail. Laws, regulations, and cases pass 
in kaleidoscopic array; the lawyer's concern is to fit them into 
significant patterns to meet new problems. For this purpose, com-
parative presentation of the historic phenomena of law, expressed 
in logical theory, provides a more effective training for legal prac-
tice, than a superficial casuistry of ephemeral statutory provisions 
or decisions embalmed in the fading cells of memory. At the same 
time, such a comparative synthesis of contemporary legal culture 
will materially facilitate the necessary reorientation of legal educa-
tion in the United States to serve international as well as domestic 
needs. 
V 
The scene that thus confronts us in the field of legal education 
10 For recent discussion of comparative legal instruction in the United States, see 
Stevenson, "Comparative and Foreign Law in American Law Schools," 50 CoL. L. R.Ev. 613 
(1950); Re, "Comparative Law Courses in the Law School Curriculum," 1 AM. J. CoMP. 
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is of course not entirely unrelieved. In the first place, after the 
early abortive attempts to institute lectures on law in the colleges, 
account must be taken of the extensive instruction later provided 
outside of the law schools in political and other branches of social 
science, including legal history, political and legal theory, public 
law, and even Roman law, supplementing and indirectly influenc-
ing the formal professional training. In the second place, within 
the law schools themselves, efforts, recently reviewed in the 
Journal of Legal Education by Professor Currie,11 have been made, 
with varying success, to liberalize the professional curriculum. 
Among these should be mentioned: 
First, the program of what President Woolsey of Yale Univer-
sity in 1874 termed "the ideal Law School-where might be ac-
quired a knowledge of the history of law, the doctrines of finance 
and taxation, comparative legislation and other liberal branches,"12 
as introduced at the Yale Law School in 1876 during the admin-
istration of Dean Wayland, comprised a two-year undergraduate 
course, including, in addition to the usual technical branches, 
lectures on various nonvocational topics, and a further two-year 
graduate program. 
Second, contemporaneously at Columbia University, the ap-
pointment of John W. Burgess in 1876 to fill the vacancy left by 
Francis Lieber's death in 1872, led to the establishment of the 
Graduate School of Political Science in 1880. By this "master 
stroke of diplomacy," occasioned by the opposition to including 
public law subjects in the basic private law course of instruction,13 
which its then famous dean, Theodore Dwight, said would be like 
planting a upas tree in the garden of paradise, a unique and effec-
tive means was provided, by the system of joint appointment to the 
L. 233 (1952); Schlesinger, "Teaching Comparative Law,'' 3 AM. J. CoMP. L. 492 (1954); 
Bolgar, "Comparative Law in Legal Education,'' I N.Y. LAw FORUM 389 (1955), and ref-
erences cited. 
11 "The Materials of Legal Study," 3 J. LEGAL En. 331 (1951) and 8 id. I (1955). 
12 Dagget, "The Yale Law School," I GREEN BAG 239 at 253 (1889). 
13 This is not to intimate that Dwight opposed public law instruction except as it 
would interfere with the two-year regular course in private law topics. To the contrary, 
as appears from his article on "Columbia College Law School," I GREEN BAG 141 at 158 
(1889), as well as from the HISTORY OF THE SCHOOL OF LAw, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, pre-
pared under the direction of Julius Goebel, Jr., chapters iii and iv, 44 ff. (1955), Dwight 
had truly liberal views of university education, was primarily instrumental in bringing 
Burgess to Columbia, and indeed regarded the establishment of the School of Political 
Science with favor. Nevertheless, Dwight opposed the integration of public law in the 
ordinary course of legal instruction, and with a certain justice, since in 1858 when the 
Columbia School of Law was established, as he stated, "the City of New York was, so far 
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graduate and law faculties, to integrate the courses in constitu-
tional law, comparative jurisprudence, international law, and other 
supposedly nonvocational branches of legal or social science, of-
fered by the graduate school, with the professional legal instruc-
tion. 
Third, later came the development of graduate programs in 
law, of which that instituted at Harvard in 1909 and notably pro-
moted by Roscoe Pound sparked analogous programs in other in-
stitutions. This was in substance a fourth year of study in course, 
chiefly in nonvocational subjects, Roman and modern civil law 
originally being required. The underlying theory, continuing the 
policy of Langdell and Ames and at the same time recognizing the 
need for broader legal training, was that graduate instruction of 
law teachers and their individual research in the cultural aspects 
of law would effectively diffuse the necessary enlightenment among 
their pupils. This plan avoided admixture of abstract cultural 
subjects with the concrete practical detail of the professional 
courses, on the assumption that culture need not be taught in 
course-a curious argument, as the graduate program was organized 
strictly on a course basis and it was never supposed that technical 
courses for undergraduates should be expendable.14 
Fourth, in 1926-28, the Columbia Law School undertook, un-
der the driving leadership of Herman Oliphant and Underhill 
· Moore, the most extensive survey of the professional law cur-
riculum ever made in the United States.15 While the organization 
of the Graduate School of Political Science at Columbia in 1880 
alongside of the Law School, and the introduction of graduate 
legal studies at Harvard and elsewhere after 1909 had left the 
technical curriculum relatively inviolate, the purpose of the 
Columbia survey was to introduce a more realistic content and ap-
proach in the professional instruction itself. Among its results was 
to make clear that a substantial development of legal education 
along functional lines could be accomplished only on the basis of 
as legal instruction is concerned, unbroken and virgin ground.'' It was chiefly due to 
his efforts that legal instruction became recognized as superior to apprentice training 
alone. If this be true, Dwight like Story is a further example of the pervasive influence 
of the box office in American legal education. 
14 See THE CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE HARVARD I.Aw ScHooL, 1817-1917, chapter vii, 
162, especially at 167 ff. (1918). 
15 See especially SUMMARY OF STUDIES IN LEGAL EDUCATION BY THE FACULTY OF LAw OF 
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY (1928) prepared by Herman Oliphant. 
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extensive research, involving not only law as such but also social 
and economic phenomena. In the division that developed in the 
faculty respecting this program, the conviction, fortified by the 
success of the opposition, that its realization would be unduly im-
peded in a too professional environment, led to the establishment 
of the Institute for the Study of Law at The Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity in 1928. Although this venture, inadequately financed and 
doomed by the date of its foundation, had to be suspended for 
want of funds at the end of five years just when the fruit was be-
ginning to appear, it had the important secondary effects of causing 
those who remained at Columbia to execute with some success 
the program which many of them had more or less systematically 
opposed, as well as of stimulating analogous activities at Yale, 
Chicago, and elsewhere. It was a time of great interest in the im-
provement of the legal system generally as well as of legal education 
-of the establishment of the American Law Institute, the Wicker-
sham and other crime commissions, the creation of judicial coun-
cils in a number of states, the unique benefaction by W. W. Cook 
for legal research to the University of Michigan, Colonel Parker's 
notable donation to found the School of Foreign and Comparative 
Law at Columbia, and other more or less important developments, 
none of which, however, immediately touched the professional 
curriculum as such. These efforts unfortunately were soon 
paralyzed by the absorption of energies in the more imperious 
demands of the New Deal and the World War that followed the 
depression. In consequence, the latent possibilities of the Colum-
bia survey, originating in the area of business law, had no oppor-
tunity for the time being to develop significantly in fields such as 
of international and comparative law. 
More recently, in the third place, in addition to the study of 
law as a social science in the universities and the various efforts to 
enlarge the program of instruction in the law schools, the trend 
of current events has accentuated the need of comparative legal 
research. Widely extended contacts with foreign countries, re-
sulting from the war and the resumption thereafter of internation-
al commerce with all quarters of the globe, have brought home to 
many of our citizens the value of acquaintance with foreign cul-
tures, and specifically foreign laws. The cultural relations pro-
gram of the Department of State and a great variety of related ar-
rangements have facilitated exchange of students and instructors 
between the United States and other countries. It is not feasible 
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nor desirable for the law schools to remain aloof from a movement 
of such potential significance, which must inevitably present the 
question whether the system of legal education in the United 
States should be reoriented to meet the needs both of American 
law students, as prospective members of the profession from whom 
those who provide counsel in foreign, as well as in domestic affairs, 
are chiefly drawn, and also of the foreign students who attend our 
law schools. This presents a real opportunity to reconsider the 
system of legal education. The fact that funds have been made 
available to assist certain law schools in effecting much needed ad-
justments to meet these needs, notably by the Ford Foundation, is 
a source of real encouragement. While in the first instance such 
benefactions have stimulated .the improvisation of special pro-
grams for foreign students, without essentially disturbing the pro-
fessional curriculum, the fact that these involve some expensive 
duplication of effort and inferentially advertise the inadequacy 
of the regular program, invites consideration of the source of these 
maladjustments, namely, the curricular scheme itself. All this in-
spires hope that even more effective provision may be made to the 
end that the law taught in the law schools of the United States may 
become not merely a national common law of the United States 
but a system of justice such as, by its intrinsic comparative merits, 
may serve as a world law. 
These things, the development of social science in the uni-
versities, the ferment of educational experimentation in the law 
schools, and the recent intensification of interest in international 
relations, relieve somewhat the stark scene of legal education in 
the United States. But these elements should not blind our eyes 
to the fact that the major problem remains-the problem presented 
by the admission to the bar each year of thousands of graduates of 
our law schools, the great majority of whom, judged by the stand-
ards here proposed, seem deficiently equipped in language, in their 
appreciation of the basic historic elements of our political and 
social culture, and even in the general principles that provide light 
in the wilderness of concrete legal phenomena. In other words, 
the institutional type of professional law school evolved in the 
United States, in which it is sought to combine technical prepara-
tion with academic pretensions, has measurably failed itself to 
provide the essential theoretical foundation for professional prac-
tice, or to ensure instead that this is secured elsewhere; indeed, as 
a result of the limitations of the methoµ. of instruction, even the 
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coverage of the technical subjects has become inadequate. It is to 
be inferred that the theory of the prevailing law school curriculum, 
namely to combine practical training with a dash of culture in a 
three-year program, has proved inadequate for the needs of the 
legal profession today. 
VI 
As an epilogue to this cursory review of legal education in the 
United States in relation to comparative legal research, the ques-
tion naturally arises, what is to be done? 
In response, it may be assumed that to any intrinsic reform of 
the professional curriculum as such, the typical reaction will be the 
same as of Joseph Story in 1829, of Theodore Dwight in 1876, of 
Roscoe Pound in 1917, and doubtless also of those promoting 
foreign student programs today, to proposals that subjects of gen-
eral humanistic interest should be introduced in appreciable 
quantity into undergraduate legal study: These would be excel-
lent in some other course, but in the regular curriculum-Never. 
In the present case, the argument of the box office is well-nigh im-
pregnable-that is, on its level. This is simply that there is now a 
steady, increasing demand for the product; therefore, why change? 
Doubtless, the argument would be even stronger, if the market 
weakened; why take an unknown risk? This is of course specious; 
there have been two conspicuously successful models in the field 
of American legal education, both labelled Cambridge, Massa-
chusetts, but both are now of venerable vintage. The first is the 
prebuggy model of Justice Story, and the second, equally narrow, 
but equipped with a more powerful technique of analysis, is the 
Langdell model of horse-and-buggy times. Even with the refine-
ments that have been added since, the basic design has become in-
adequate for modern needs, and a new model is indicated. 
Instead of evading the issue, therefore, the following theses, 
implied in the foregoing remarks, are proposed, two relating to 
prelegal education, two to the legal curriculum as such, and two 
to extracurricular possibilities: 
I. Enough Latin to parse a passage from the Digest and a 
working knowledge of two foreign languages, e.g., sufficient to read 
Planiol or Enneccerus without discomfort, should be required £qr 
admission to law school and to practice. 
Such preparation is a matter of course across the Atlantic, and 
corresponds to the typical prerequisites in this country for ad-
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vanced work in various other sciences. Needless to say, such a re-
quirement would involve analogous readjustment in prelegal edu-
cation. 
II. General knowledge of the humanities, especially history, 
philosophy, including logic and scientific method, economics, po-
litical and other relevant branches of social science, should also be 
required for admission to law school and to practice. 
The extent of the preceding requirements should be carefully 
defined, and it is desirable that, instead of relying on college 
certificates alone, the law schools should give appropriate exami-
nations to test the qualifications of candidates for admission in 
these respects. 
III. Law school instruction should be predicated upon com-
parative orientation in the nature and evolution of legal institu-
tions and ideas. 
The function of a law school, as a department of a university, 
is to provide the requisite scientific and humanistic preparation, 
based upon on-going research, for public service in the legal pro-
fession. Emphasis upon such preparation is the only apparent 
solution for the critical dilemma of the American law school cur-
riculum, the dilemma of superficiality or inadequacy. In law 
school, building upon the prelegal background outlined above, 
the foundation for subsequent specialization should be laid 
through an adequate synthesis of the more significant legal doc-
trines, policies, and trends, inculcating in the student the most 
valuable product of legal education-the ability to think like a 
lawyer. For this purpose, historical and theoretical instruction 
should be provided in at least the following subject matters: 
1. The basic conceptions and policies of law, as exempli-
fied by comparison of the common-law and civil-law 
systems. 
2. Roman law, and the history of the common law and 
the civil law. 
3. The principal legal and political theories. 
Incidentally, this basic instruction need not require more than 
a semester's time. 
IV. As a rule, the principal courses in particular branches of 
law should be presented on a comparative basis. 
At present, the major professional courses are necessarily and 
typically treated on a demi-comparative basis, since they are de-
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signed to present the national law of the United States. Their 
scope could be advantageously broadened without undue strain. 
Professor Gorla's recent study of contracts law,16 for example, in-
dicates that the course in contracts would benefit by comparative 
treatment including civil-law as well as common-law matter, and 
the same is true of other subjects, among which conflict of laws 
and negotiable instruments may be instanced. The systematic 
inclusion of materials in such courses from the principal civil-law 
countries as well as from those in the British Commonwealth, 
would have two salutary effects: it would require more incisive 
analysis of legal problems, since their solution would be less de-
pendent upon the accidents of legislation in a particular country, 
and it would thus promote instruction of more universal, and not 
merely local, value. 
Moreover, it should be apparent that such treatment will pro-
vide a far more satisfactory basis for significant comparative re-
search than the endeavor in a short course or two of so-called com-
parative law to sweep together curious fragments from the universe 
of legal history, in a vaudeville, ranging perhaps from Ham-
murabi to Nuremberg. In fact, efforts to teach comparative law as 
such, instead of utilizing comparison as a basic technique for deal-
ing with legal problems, while doubtless better than nothing, are 
something of a menace to the development of serious comparative 
studies. Too frequently, the treatment must be superficial; it 
duplicates the subject matter of other courses; and it labels com-
parative law as extraneous to the central subjects of legal educa-
tion. It is not to be expected that isolated courses of this nature, 
ostensibly devoted to a law that never was on land or sea, will sig-
nificantly influence the legal scene. To do this, it needs more than 
another excrescent patch on the old curricular buggy. 
V. Special efforts should be made to enlist the interest of 
members of the legal profession generally in comparative legal 
studies and to provide the necessary materials. 
The most dismaying aspect of the scene as here envisaged, is a 
consequence of the fact that American legal education has been 
comparatively defective now for well over a century. While the 
experience in medicine suggests that extensive postgraduate edu-
cation should be possible in other· professions, if one may say so 
16 IL CONTRA'ITO. PROBLEM[ FONDAMENTAL[ TRA'ITATI CON IL METODO COMPARATIVO E 
CASISTICO (1955). 
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with all respect, it would not do to be too sanguine in the case of 
the bench and bar. For one thing, the value of science is less 
easily demonstrated in law than in medicine; in the ~edical case, 
improper treatment may well result in the patient's death or at 
least his continued disability, whereas in case of an unjust judg-
ment or unenlightened conduct of litigation, the client pays, and 
pays with_out being able to prove that he has been bilked. Hence 
too, the very human tendency in proportion to one's success in 
later years to envelope the good old student days in a roseate halo 
of perfection, to assume that what one studied then was just right, · 
forms a real psychological barrier to spending. busy hours in learn-
ing what is new. Some such complacent assumption, it is under-
stood, was the reason why even nominal instruction in compara-
tive law was discontinued not so long since in an important law 
school by a most eminent, successful, and internationally-minded 
leader of the profession. The argument of professional success is 
peculiarly inaccessible; how prove, for example, that Lincoln 
would have been a better lawyer, if he had attended law school. 
Hence, it is the more imperative to do whatever possible to 
enlist the interest of members of the profession and to enable them 
to keep abreast of the developments in law and legal science here 
and abroad, as their interest may develop. At least, without re-
ferring to other means, the necessary materials should be made 
available in English for those who are not in position themselves 
to specialize in the subject matter. Reference has above been 
made to the disparity in publications providing comparative legal 
information-treatises, monographs, translations, and the like-ap-
pearing in the United States, relative to its population, resources, 
and international interests. Here is a real challenge to American 
legal science. To meet a limited aspect of this obvious need, the 
American Journal of Comparative Law has made a propitious 
· start, while the Association through which the leading American 
law schools and the American Foreign Law Association support 
the Journal offers a potential co-operative basis for additional un-
dertakings that cannot be effectively assumed by individual . 
scholars or institutions and for which the necessary funds may be 
made available. Yet this is but a beginning, and without discount-
ing other worthy efforts, it is clear that far more in the preparation 
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and publication of relevant materials remains to be done to vitalize 
comparative legal research in the United States. 
VI. Systematic attention should be given to the development 
of a corps of specialists in comparative legal research to staff the 
law schools. 
For the program outlined, it is vital that there should be a 
sufficient continuing supply of qualified individuals from whom 
the law schools ca~ be staffed. Indeed, such a corps of specialists 
is no less needed to provide expert counsel in government and 
business. To meet this need, in the first place, it would be im-
. · mediately expedient to organize, perhaps in a co-operative in-
stitute of advanced legal studies, drawing upon the present limited 
pool of available talent, a program of specialized comparative train-
ing, for those who are now, or will soon be, available for appoint-
ment. At the same time, in the second place-and this in the long 
run will be indispensable-the recruitment practices of the law 
schools should be standardized, so as to ensure that their staffs 
have the requisite qualifications. In other words, there is a specific 
need to develop individuals who have special aptitude for ad-
vanced legal studies and to devise means, on the basis of demon-
strated competence, for the appointment of the best of these to 
the law faculties. 
This, it need scarcely be pointed out, is merely recognized 
practice in other branches of university education. At present, 
however, in the field of legal instruction, the problems of personnel 
are left in a degree to ad hoc executive decision, wtth the result 
that at times important posts go to alumni who have still to win 
their spurs in the world of legal scholarship. Such practices can 
scarcely be excused on the ground of emergency due to inadequate 
planning. It is all too obvious that, unless provision is made to 
have properly qualified candidates available and there is reason-
able assurance that priority in appointment and promotion will be 
given to such as have demonstrated real intellectual and scientific 
attainments in advanced legal research, the existing situation, such 
as it is, will inevitably tend to perpetuate itself in both legal edu-
cation and consequently in the profession at large. This delicate 
and crucial matter merits systematic consideration-there should 
be recognized and severe standards for appointment and promo-
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tion; corresponding advanced training should be provided; and 
those who have shown the best qualifications, on an open com-
petitive basis so far as possible, should be preferred. 
VII 
Whatever enthusiasm may be evoked by the foregoing pro-
gram, outlining certain essential requirements for the study of law 
sub specie universitatis, or in other words as a comparative science, 
will doubtless be assailed by various questions and doubts, not to 
say quibbles. Just what is involved? the blueprint-minded will 
inquire. Who is to do all this research? Or even give such 
courses? It is not feasible here to elaborate all such detail, but a 
few general observations on ways and means may be made to antic-
ipate some of the inevitable tergiversations. 
First, no blueprint has been offered for a variety of reasons: 
such has been sufficiently sketched elsewhere;17 it is inexpedient 
for the present purpose to confuse the basic problem of American 
legal education with subordinate matters; and in the view here 
taken, the question of comparative legal research is as wide and 
deep as the whole universe of legal phenomena, a house of many 
mansions, as Pound once said of jurisprudence. Hence, applica-
tion of the recommendations here outlined may appropriately vary 
according to local conditions. 
Second, on the question of personnel, if the program is needed 
and requires qualifications- not yet sufficiently satisfied by the 
present law school products, suitable steps should at once be taken 
to remedy the situation. For this purpose, apart from the pos-
sibility of enlisting the temporary assistance of visiting jurists, 
which has been too little explored, attention is drawn to the fact 
that the upheavals in various countries in recent years have 
brought to the United States a number of individuals trained in 
various branches of the civil law who are highly qualified to assist 
in the formation of such a specialized corps of future instructors 
and researchers as well as in the general courses proposed. It is 
one of the tragedies of our time that, while their colleagues in 
other sciences are readily transplanted, so many of these displaced 
and gifted jurists have not been effectively integrated into our sys-
tem of legal education. One would not like to imagine that this 
17 E.g., the writer's "Roman Law as the Basis of Comparative Law," in 2 LAw: A 
CENTURY OF PROGRESS, 1835-1935, 346 ff. (1937). 
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may be due in the slightest degree to latent xenophobia excused 
by the supposed particularity of American law. In any event, it 
'does not make sense to refuse their services and at the same time 
to contend that the program outlined cannot be realized on the 
ground that there are too few qualified persons among the grad-
uates of our own law schools. 
Third, it is apparent that much can be done along the lines 
proposed without serious dislocation of the scheme of things as 
they are. For example, it is not suggested that the three-year term 
of law school study, which is apparently fixed in this scheme and 
becomes each year more obviously inadequate under present con-
ditions, should be changed. Instead of making futile efforts to 
remedy this situation by robbing the colleges of a year or two of 
prelegal training or to add a year of graduate study for a minor 
fraction of the bar, if a leaf were taken out of the European ex-
perience or that of other sciences, so as to differentiate between 
the basic scientific instruction to be provided by the university and 
the practical training to be provided largely on an "in service" 
basis, the problem would be susceptible of solution. Law school 
instruction could be concentrated on the humanistic and theoreti-
cal aspects of law, suitable for university study; the period of prac-
tical training, which would be efficiently related to active prac-
tice, could be extended as needed without affecting the three-year 
term in the law school itself. This would of course reverse the 
present trend; instead of discarding or squeezing essential topics 
to make room for more and more technical detail in law school, at-
tention to specialized matters of practice would be reduced or left 
to the postgraduate apprentice period, in order to ensure proper 
education in the fundamentals. 
Fourth, to implement a program such as this, it would be help-
ful if means could be found to reduce somewhat the existing 
anarchy in legal education. At present, requirements of admission 
to law school and the arrangement and contents of the curriculum 
are more or less independently decided by each school typically in 
camera, subject of course to the general factors fixed by the col-
leges and the bar examiners. This is true even of a matter so vital 
as the prerequisites of faculty appointment, which in Europe are 
guaranteed by public competition or by rigorous preparation for 
the agregation or its equivalent. A central authority to regulate 
such matters would doubtless infringe the radiation of the Tenth 
Amendment, but there is no inherent reason why comm.on prob-
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lems of this character should not be commonly considered and cer-
tain standards established, if not by the appropriate associations of 
the profession, at least by joint action of the leading institutions. 
If this were done, it would alleviate somewhat the confusion and 
delays that in the present situation automatically clog reform. 
Fifth, whether or not it may be possible to introduce an ade-
quate program of comparative legal research in the professional 
law schools in our time-and the chances are always that argu-
ments for existing interests will prevail until some crisis super-
venes-it would be highly expedient, in this rich and phenomenally 
prosperous country, with its far-flung international interests, that 
there should be at least one single center adequately equipped and 
devoted to the scientific study of law, including comparative legal 
research, as here envisaged. From this point of view, the suspen-
sion of the.Institute at Baltimore was a real misfortune. It is not 
to be expected that successful going institutions will be easily re-
formed or that schools of and for practitioners readily be trans-
muted into centers of advanced legal study. If an allusion may be 
made again to the experience in medical education, it will be re-
called that the most important step in the medical history of the 
United States was the ~ecision of the Rockefeller group to estab-
lish the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research and at the 
same time to develop the medical school at The Johns Hopkins 
University as a pilot institution. An analogous institutionaliza-
tion of humanistic legal studies, with relative freedom from in-
herited professional prepossessions, would inevitably accelerate the 
needed reform of our scheme of legal education. 
VIII 
In sum, the call that comes from the scene of American legal 
education is clear. The time is overdue to justify the pretensions 
of law as a university discipline. This means quite simply that the 
study of law should be conducted on the objective level of rational 
scientific inquiry, including notably comparative legal research. 
It has been shown that such a reform, focussing instruction and 
research in the law schools upon the basic criteria of justice, rather 
than upon casuistic derivation aI?,d technical application of posi-
tive law in particular cases, will serve to resolve the existing dilem-
ma of the law schools, enabling them to give more adequate prep-
aration in the fundamentals and at the same time providing more 
scope for specialized training in practice thereafter; that this will 
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foster comparative and other types of legal research, much needed 
to improve the knowledge of law; and that in fine it will contribute 
to ensure that the profession which above all others is responsible 
for the guidance of international, political, economic, and social 
affairs, should be truly learned. 
It it also clear that such advancement of legal study as a uni-
versity discipline concerns not merely the law schools but also the 
public at large, and specifically the universities which have en-
dowed them with the mantle of scientific prestige. It behooves 
the universities to require that what is taught in law school is 
worthy of their name. It was stultifying, as Holmes once observed, 
to teach law as a blind tradition; but it is no less reprehensible to 
treat law as a relative concatenation of imperatives imposed by 
official authority, or as merely a technique, a craft of clever tricks 
of the trade, without consideration of the human effects and with-
out objective research to determine the justice of what is imposed. 
For law by its very nature involves interference with human lib-
erty, and this can be justified only by demonstrated need. What, 
for example, would be said of a surgeon who was accustomed to 
operate on a hunch, without careful diagnosis based upon the re-
sults of the best available research? And yet one of the most bril-
liant figures on the bench today once described the judicial pro-
cess in such terms.18 As this will suggest, the question of American 
legal education is of more than professional concern-it involves 
issues of deep public and moral interest. 
In this context, the contemporary trend of legal speculation in 
a number of countries is significant. It evidences the profound 
need of modern times for a rational or scientific basis to evaluate 
the plethora of laws and orders that carry the cachet of authority. 
As Chief Justice Warren has currently observed, what all legal sys-
tems most need today is "a vital concern for the ideal of justice."19 
Even in Germany, the Mecca of legal relativism, it has finally been 
observed by recent thinkers such as Radbruch and Going, after the 
final Goetterdaemmerung of National Socialism at Berlin, that 
there are limits, social and moral, to the efficacy of law, conceived as 
the mandate of organized power. This retreat from formal juris-
prudence and renewed interest in the natural and rational condi-
18 Hutcheson, "The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the 'Hunch' in Judicial 
Decision," 14 CoRN. L.Q. 274 (1929). 
19 "The Law and the Future," 52 FORTUNE 106 at 229 (Nov. 1955). 
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tions of the legal order undoubtedly reflects a deep discontent with 
what government has done or failed to do in recent years. At the 
same time, it points to what Raymond Fosdick and others have 
remarked a generation since: the relative backwardness of the 
humanistic sciences as compared with natural science and tech-
nology. This is a condition for which the university law schools 
cannot disclaim responsibility. For, so long as there is crime, 
poverty, or injustice, or the scourge of war hangs like the sword 
of Damocles over mankind, it cannot be assumed that technical 
proficiency and material progress alone will resolve human needs. 
In this situation, law occupies a strategic place, as the chief instru-
ment by which the peace and welfare of mankind is systematically 
secured. This was understood by the great Roman jurists, who in 
Savigny's judgment most perfectly joined theory and practice; law, 
as elegantly defined by Celsus, is the ars boni et aequi, the realiza-
tion of justice in human affairs. Here, in the last analysis, is the 
reason why the study of law in a university must be more than 
indoctrination in technique; its distinctive object is legal science 
and research as the rational means to maintain and improve the 
legal order which is the primary condition of modem civilization 
and of all that we hold most dear. 
